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Encounters with History:  
Dealing with the ‘Present Past’ in Guatemala 
Anika Oettler  
As Jonathan D. Tepperman observed in 2002, the ‘truth business […] is booming. 
A new academic discipline has sprung up to study the [truth] commissions […]. 
Numerous books and articles on the subject appear each year’ (Tepperman 2002, 
128). Dozens of articles and a few books (I wrote one myself) on the Guatemalan 
truth commission have appeared in recent years. By contributing once more to this 
stream of publications, I hope to introduce a new analytical approach into aca-
demic debate and to reduce the number of myths that are circulating in public dis-
course on truth commissions. 
 Even critical authors such as Tepperman reproduce myths about truth commis-
sions.1 Tepperman states that ‘truth commissions are tools that traumatized coun-
tries use to set the historical record straight. The commissions allow newly democ-
ratic nations to investigate the crimes of the past, overturning the lies told by pre-
vious regimes to cover up their abuses’ (2002, 129). This explanation of the raison 
d’être of truth commissions contains the basic myth concerning the subject that is 
dealing with the past: Is it a country? A nation? Is a country traumatized? Is a 
country using a tool? Is a nation investigating the past? And, finally: are only re-
gimes telling lies? What is a lie? 
 In answering these questions, we should instead abandon the idea of a single 
(national) subject dealing with the past. As Halbwachs stated, different communi-
ties of memory are involved in the endless process of transforming social memory 
(Halbwachs 1966). Egyptologist Jan Assmann distinguishes two registers of collec-
tive memory: communicative memory and cultural memory (1999). On the one 
hand, historical memory is constituted by daily communication, by exchanging life 
experiences. This communicative memory evolves in time and disappears with its 
holders, that is to say, generational memory. In contrast, cultural memory is more 
stable and conserves the past by a distinct group of specialists and via cultural pat-
terns. Cultural memory is defined as ‘the re-usable and available texts, images and 
rites of each society, with the preservation of which it stabilizes and spreads its 
self-image’ (Assmann 1988, 15)  
 Applying this concept to the Guatemalan experience, it is possible to detect 
different registers of collective memory and different communities of memory af-
fected by official and nonofficial truth finding (Oettler 2004). The Guatemalan 
experience is an excellent example of how truth commissions do (and fail to) affect 
national politics and individuals as well as collective memory, and it urges us to 
abandon the myths mentioned above. 
 The following paragraphs briefly summarize the process of official and nonof-
ficial truth finding in Guatemala. While many analysts have dealt with the policy 
cycle related to the work of truth commissions,2 few have noted the historiographic 
significance of truth commissions.3 In trying to fill this gap, I will discuss the his-
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toric narrative presented by the CEH (La Comisión para El Esclarecimiento 
Histórico).4 The presentation of the final report of the Guatemalan Truth Commis-
sion in February 1999 has not been the last public encounter with memory in Gua-
temala. Since trials and symbolic and material acts of reparation have a lasting in-
fluence on collective memory, I will summarize the relevant events. Which com-
munities of memory were affected by which truth finding efforts in the long run? 
In sum, the complex structure of collective memory – of narratives and counter-
narratives – will be outlined.  
A brief history of Guatemalan truth finding 
In Guatemala, the debate on the creation of a truth commission dates back to the 
mid-1980s when the relatives of the disappeared began to protest against repres-
sion.5 In 1984, a group of Ladina women from the capital came together to demand 
the return of their husbands and sons, and formed the Grupo de Apoyo Mútuo – 
GAM.6 Connected to the emerging continental movement of ‘relatives of the de-
tained-disappeared’, GAM began to fight for the creation of a truth commission. 
During the 1980s, two non-independent official investigative bodies were set up, 
and both came to the conclusion that not a single case of disappearance had oc-
curred in Guatemala (CEH, Vol. VI, 150). Regardless of this, GAM continued lob-
bying for a truth commission.  
 When GAM was formed it represented the political demands of Ladina women 
searching for their disappeared relatives – in many cases active members of politi-
cal parties, trade unions or student organizations. Soon after its formation, GAM 
began to incorporate women and families from remote parts of the Guatemalan 
highlands who had survived the ‘scorched earth policy’. Under the dictators Lucas 
García (1978-1982) and Ríos Montt (1982-1983), the military had persecuted the 
indigenous population identified as the social support base for the guerrillas, who 
had begun to operate in the western and northern parts of the country (Oettler 
2006). The counter-insurgency forces attempted to destroy this social backing by 
extinguishing entire communities, executing indigenous leaders, destroying crops, 
and persecuting fleeing survivors. These ‘scorched earth operations’ were carried 
out with extreme brutality and included the forced involvement of civilians. Start-
ing in 1981, the military compelled the male population to join organizations called 
Civil Defence Patrols (PACs) that had to observe and denounce their communities 
and participate in acts of extreme cruelty. Approximately 1.5 million people were 
displaced internally or externally, and thousands of survivors ‘resettled’ in strategi-
cally militarized hamlets. 
 When surviving women and families from the ‘interior’ joined GAM in the 
mid-1980s, all members shared the uncertainty regarding the destiny of their rela-
tives, or if known, the impossibility of giving them a dignified burial; but they did 
not share the same experience of terror. While GAM’s leading Ladina women had 
been confronted with the selective repression of political leaders, the indigenous 
campesinos faced the fact that military efforts were being made to eliminate their 
whole culture and their physical existence. GAM slowly transformed into a more 
political organization by trying to enforce two main demands, the official investi-
gation of human rights violations and the punishment of those responsible for the 
crimes committed. In view of the experiences with the two non-independent offi-
cial investigative bodies, the demand to investigate the crimes turned into an essen-
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tial condition to punish the guilty.  
 When the Guatemalan government finally entered into peace talks with the 
guerrilla army URNG (Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca), the latter 
supported the demand for the creation of a truth commission. The question of how 
to deal with the past turned out to be one of the main obstacles to bringing the 
peace negotiations to an end.7 While military hardliners rejected all attempts to 
deal with the past, a powerful faction of ‘institutionalists’ supported the idea of 
creating a truth commission: as minister of defence Mario Enríquez pointed out in 
1994, ‘Just like in Chile: truth, but no trials’ (Hayner 2001, 86). 
 After a seemingly endless marathon of negotiations, the ‘Agreement on the 
Establishment of the Commission for the Historical Clarification of Human Rights 
Violations and Acts of Violence which have caused Suffering to the Guatemalan 
People’ was signed in June 1994. Being the only instrument of transitional justice 
provided for in the accords, the agreement on the creation of a truth commission 
could only be explained as a concession to international norms. The government 
and the guerrilla army found themselves obliged to conform to a minimum stan-
dard when dealing with the past (Oettler 2004, chapter 3). The Guatemalan process 
of agenda setting is a demonstration of how global norms of transitional justice are 
transmitted into national politics. It is particularly noteworthy that these norms 
were never internalized by key political actors. As in many other cases (for exam-
ple, El Salvador, Colombia, Sierra Leone), the international mediators and the two 
warring parties had to compromise. The result was half-hearted. Speakers repre-
senting the left spectrum of civil society harshly criticized the accord because it 
designed a commission with a limited mandate. The commission, which was to be 
set up for a maximum of twelve months, was supposed to investigate all human 
rights violations and acts of violence committed over a period of 36 years. This 
‘amounted from the very outset to overburdening the CEH, and preventing it from 
discharging its mandate in a thorough fashion’ (Tomuschat 2001, 239). Moreover, 
the mandate stated that the commission was not supposed to name the names of the 
guilty or to pursue judicial aims; and that had been the most important demand of 
GAM and other human rights organizations. Prominent representatives of human 
rights organizations criticized the URNG for signing the accord and thus betraying 
civil society. 
Truth finding 
Despite their severe criticism, in the end many human rights organizations sup-
ported the process of official truth finding. After the signing of the accord, two 
supportive projects were begun; the addressees were ideologically diverse commu-
nities of memory. In 1994, groups belonging to the umbrella organizations 
CONADEGUA (Coordinadora Nacional de Derechos Humanos de Guatemala)8 
and ACPD (Asamblea Consultativa de la Población Desarraigada)9 initiated a 
project called Convergencia por la Verdad in order to hand over to the Truth 
Commission a systemized data bank of human rights violations documented by 
their member organizations. This data bank was based on the archives of human 
rights organizations, which had documented cases of human rights violations dur-
ing the past decades. Members of civil groups like GAM or the Communities of 
Population in Resistance (CPR) independently collected approximately 5,000 in-
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terviews with victims of human rights violations. Based on the material provided 
by Convergencia por la Verdad, Patrick Ball, Paul Kobrak and Herbert F. Spirer 
(1999) wrote the study, State Violence in Guatemala. 1960-1996: A Quantitative 
Reflection. The data bank was used as one of three sources for the Truth Commis-
sion when it estimated the number of victims of the entire internal conflict. Yet it is 
important to recall that many survivors of state violence belonging to various popu-
lar movement organizations had already testified in 1994. After that, REMHI (Pro-
yecto Interdiocesano Recuperación de la Memoria Histórica de Guatemala)10 and 
CEH gathered qualitative interviews. Thus, in the end, the history that many politi-
cally active victims had lived through was not fully put on record. 
 In 1995, the Human Rights Office of the Archdiocese of Guatemala initiated a 
second project to support the work of the truth commission with the intention of 
handing over a report to the official commission based on its own human rights 
archive. But discussions on the nature and the psychological effects of the Guate-
malan internal conflict revealed that it was quite impossible to document the hor-
rors of the past without gaining the confidence of the victims. Realizing that the 
official truth commission would not be able to overcome the walls of mistrust in 
the affected communities, the founders of REMHI developed an alternative method 
of truth finding which was based on the existing network of Catholic communities 
and the credibility of the Catholic Church in the most affected regions. In 1995, 
long before the signing of the final peace accord, REMHI began training approxi-
mately 600 voluntary interviewers from rural communities, who later on were 
called animadores. The training not only included the methods of carrying out in-
terviews but also provided a protected space for the exchange of experiences. The 
founders of the project were confronted with the fact that many interviewers did 
not know about national history of the internal war: they interpreted their own suf-
fering within the horizon of local history. The initial aim of elaborating a quantita-
tive report on human rights violations delved further into the background, and the 
project attempted to break the silence, reconstruct the frames of memory, and help 
rebuild broken communities. The villages in which REMHI was able to establish 
stable groups of ‘animadores’ formed the most important public framework for 
talking about personal suffering, learning about national history and working 
through the past. When many victims who had experienced, remembered and in-
terpreted the armed confrontations within the local horizon of their communities 
contacted the REMHI project and its animadores, they learned about national poli-
tics and history for the first time in their lives. Previously, many victims had felt 
responsible for what had happened and, therefore, had blamed themselves for their 
relative’s or neighbour’s death. Once they started to talk about their experiences 
and listen to the experiences of others, they began to realize that their individual 
suffering corresponded to a nation-wide strategy of counter-insurgency. The Pro-
ject to Recover Historical Memory did more than reconstruct memories: it gave 
historic events a new and broader sense. The local history of repression fitted into a 
national strategy of repression and its deeper historical roots. The process of recon-
structing memories implied (in restricted areas of the country) the weakening of the 
National Security Doctrine, which was formerly the hegemonic military truth. 
 In contrast to official truth commissions, the work of REMHI did not end with 
the presentation of its findings. The process of working through cruel experiences 
was led mainly by Catholic priests and lay persons inspired by liberation theology. 
They have continued to carry on projects of psychosocial and legal assistance, 
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seminars on national, regional and local history, and exhumation processes. When 
the report ‘Guatemala – nunca más!’ (never again!), which concentrated on reveal-
ing the mechanisms of terror and explaining the human experience, was released in 
April 1998, the appalling Guatemalan past became, for the first time, an item on 
the national agenda. Only 24 hours after it was published, the co-ordinator of 
REMHI, Bishop Juan Gerardi Conadera, was murdered in his garage. The 75-year 
old bishop had symbolized not only the struggle against repression but also the 
struggle to reach a peace accord: when he was Bishop of El Quiché in the 1980s, 
he was forced to close his diocese. He then founded the Guatemalan Church in 
Exile and, after his return from Costa Rica, was nominated Assistant Bishop of the 
Archdioceses of Guatemala. He founded the Archbishop’s Human Rights Office 
and participated in the National Reconciliation Commission, which was a key in-
strument on the peace negotiating process. His assassination was widely inter-
preted as an effort to silence those who were interested in discovering the truth and 
to obstruct the work of the official Truth Commission.11 
 Months before, in July 1997, the official Truth Commission CEH had started its 
work. The accord on the creation of the commission prescribed that the CEH 
should be created after the signing of the final peace accord. When the delegations 
of the URNG and the government signed the ‘firm and lasting’ peace in December 
1996, they agreed on a comprehensive set of reforms. The decision about official 
Politics of the Past12 was just one element of a political programme including the 
restructuring of civil-military relations, reforming the social agenda as well as the 
judiciary, promoting indigenous rights, and modernizing the agrarian sector. Given 
that some military hardliners rejected the idea of dealing with the past, while sec-
tions of leftist civil society demanded that the guilty be punished, the negotiating 
delegations chose the ‘middle way’ of investigating the past without imposing any 
judicial consequences, a course which fitted in with the concept of guilt, confession 
and conciliation supported by the Catholic Church (Grandin 2002). Thus, the Gua-
temalan programme of dealing with the past corresponded to the more recent trend, 
which concentrated on truth finding. Soon after the final peace accord was signed, 
the Guatemalan congress passed an amnesty law excluding torture, genocide and 
disappearances. The third traditional tool of official treatment of past abuses was 
postponed: the guerrillas and the government decided that the truth commission 
should recommend measures of restitution, compensation and rehabilitation.13  
 The CEH was headed by the German law Professor, Christian Tomuschat, who 
appointed two Guatemalan members to the Truth Commission: the lawyer Alfredo 
Balsells Tojo and the indigenous educator Otilia Lux de Cotí. In September 1997 
the commission started its fieldwork, which was mainly doing interviews, and pre-
sented its final report on 25 February 1999. During this period, the commission 
collected 7,338 individual and collective interviews and built up a comprehensive 
archive. The latter included a set of declassified US-documents, which substanti-
ated the commission’s findings and made it too difficult to declare them as com-
munist propaganda.14 
 As Hayner mentioned, ‘The record of implementation of Truth Commission 
recommendations has been among the weakest aspects of truth commissions to 
date’ (Hayner 2001, 169). Nevertheless, the elaboration of recommendations is still 
seen as an important duty of truth commissions. The Guatemalan Commission for 
Historical Clarification is no exception. When the commission handed over its final 
report on 25 February 1999, it presented a comprehensive set of 84 recommenda-
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tions, which included the official acknowledgement of the responsibility of the 
state, the creation of memorials, the investigation of cases of disappearances, the 
exhumation of clandestine graves, the establishment of a comprehensive National 
Reparations Programme, the investigation of the history of high ranking military 
officers, the abolition of the Presidential General Staff (EMP), and the prosecution 
of those involved in human rights violations who were not to be given amnesty (for 
genocide, disappearances, torture). Many recommendations underlined the reforms 
as being part of the peace accords; whereas some recommendations were designed 
to strengthen the process of restructuring the military, the intelligence apparatus 
and the judiciary, others aimed at promoting Indian rights and weakening racist 
traditions. 
 First and foremost, official acknowledgement has still not been completed. The 
first – and thus basic – recommendation presented by the CEH called upon  
[…] the President of the Republic [to] recognize, before the whole of Guatema-
lan society, before the victims, their relatives and their communities, those acts 
described in this report, ask pardon for them and assume responsibility for the 
human rights violations connected with the internal armed confrontation, par-
ticularly for those committed by the army and the state security forces (CEH 
1999, Vol. 5, 61). 
A few days after the presentation of ‘Guatemala – Memory of Silence’, General 
Efraín Ríos Montt whose name is almost synonymous with the ‘scorched earth 
politics’, defended his historical viewpoint and pointed out that the guerrilla army 
had been responsible for civil victims, as it had used them as human shields (inter-
view in Prensa Libre, 28 February 1999). The then governing head of state, Alvaro 
Arzú, referred to a public event that had been celebrated in December 1998 on the 
occasion of the second anniversary of the signing of the Peace Accords. During 
this public act, celebrated in the stadium of Santa Cruz del Quiché, the President 
had vaguely apologized for past crimes – without knowing the commissions’ find-
ings (Miranda 1999).  
 When newly-elected president Alfonso Portillo took office in January 2000, he 
announced that he would carry out the recommendations. During the inauguration 
ceremony, he held a minute’s silence for the victims of war – standing only few 
metres from party colleague General Efraín Rios Montt, who had just been elected 
president of congress. The ceremony demonstrated that the official recognition of 
past atrocities could also serve as a political alibi, sometimes being truly cynical. 
 In 2004, a shift in memory politics was demonstrated by Portillo’s successor 
Oscar Berger, whose seriousness and sustainability have not yet been proved. Fol-
lowing a sentence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, he acknowledged 
the Guatemalan government’s responsibility for the 1990 killing of anthropologist 
Myrna Mack Chang. It was interpreted as an encouraging signal by many observ-
ers (see Inforpress Centromericana, No. 1557, 30 April 2004), though the lack of 
justice and punishment was still denounced. When the president signed the book of 
condolence for Monseñor Gerardi at the seventh anniversary of his assassination in 
April 2005, he was continuing the politics of accountability. Nevertheless, the 
symbolic recognition of past crimes has still not translated into a comprehensive 
regimen of policy and practice that includes justice reform, exhumation policy, and 
defence of human rights.  
 The problem of amnesty as the ‘moral Achilles’ heel’ of truth commissions 
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(Kiss 2000, 74) has still not been addressed in a decisive and sustainable manner. 
In 1999 the CEH concluded that ‘the judiciary became functionally inoperative 
with respect to its role of protecting the individual from the State, and lost all 
credibility as guarantor of an effective legal system’ (CEH 1999, Vol. V, §56). 
Little has changed since then. The weakness of the justice system continues due to 
inadequate resources, poorly trained and heavily threatened personnel, and the dy-
namics of impunity itself. Despite the commitments made by presidents Portillo 
and Berger to end impunity, witnesses, judges and human rights defenders them-
selves were (and continue to be) threatened, attacked and even killed. Therefore, 
impunity for past abuses cannot be attributed to the amnesty law passed in 1996. 
‘Guatemalan courts have proven so unreliable in prosecuting human rights crimes that 
an amnesty was arguably not necessary to protect perpetrators’ (Popkin 2000, 157). 
 As some of the best-known cases of human rights violations show, the judiciary 
is incapable of carrying out prosecutions. Since the transition to formal democracy 
in the mid-1980s, only a few cases have been prosecuted in the courts – and even 
fewer sentences have got past the various stages of appeal (for a qualitative analy-
sis of impunity, see Fundación Myrna Mack 2004). In March 2005, a court of ap-
peals reduced the sentences by ten years for Col. Byron Lima Estrada and his son, 
Capt. Byron Lima Oliva, who had been convicted for the 1998 murder of Mon-
señor Juan Gerardi. In 2001, they had received sentences of thirty years. Since they 
have already been in prison for six years, both men could be released at an earlier 
date. This case and its various stages of appeal15 show that Guatemalan trials do not 
strengthen the rule of law. Moreover, they seldom acknowledge the truth or restore 
the dignity of the victims in a sustainable manner. When the court of appeals re-
duced the sentences in March 2005, it reclassified the murderers as ‘accomplices’. 
For the victim and for the public in general, a court’s judgement means public ac-
knowledgement that either the victim is the victim of a crime rather than the victim 
of an impersonal, structural conflict (Günther 1997), or, in the worst case, respon-
sible for his/her own suffering. If a court of appeals issues a revised ruling a few 
months or years later, the truth pertaining to the crime is similarly revised. 
 As cultural memory is created and recreated by constant friction between his-
tory and memory, it is also influenced by trials. Since the CEH released its report 
in 1999, there have been numerous encounters between perpetrators and victims of 
human rights violations in court. In some cases, the court’s decisions strengthened 
the subordinate truth of the victims (for example, Myrna Mack), but in most cases, 
dominant military or clandestine groups were able to win the battle over memory 
and memories.  
 Whereas truth commissions and trials are the most common instruments of 
transitional justice, a third path is often left aside by academics (Ash 1998, 36) and 
postponed by politicians: compensation or restitution. As Fuchs and Nolte (2004) 
pointed out, the way of dealing with past atrocities is constantly being reviewed, 
changed or even temporarily interrupted. The course of transitional justice evolves 
in distinct stages, each characterized by a certain mix of policies. In most Latin 
American countries the complex issue of compensation and restitution was not 
recognized as a main policy problem during the transition period. Although human 
rights organizations had already expressed the necessity of compensation under 
authoritarian rule, the problem was not put on the formal political agenda when the 
succeeding regime began to deal with the past. In Argentina and Chile, the issue of 
compensation was seriously considered during a second stage of ‘transitional jus-
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tice’ (Fuchs and Nolte 2004, 87).  
 Symbolic and material acts of reparation ‘play an important role in processes of 
opening space for bereavement, addressing trauma and ritualising symbolic clo-
sure. They acknowledge and recognize the individual’s suffering and place it 
within a new and officially sanctioned history of trauma’ (Hamber and Wilson 
1999). Thus, the politics of reparation constitute a central stage for friction between 
memory and history. Notwithstanding the severe psychical implications of individ-
ual reparation payments, the process of agenda setting as such is an important field 
of public acknowledgement of past abuses. 
 In Guatemala, the politics of reparation entered the stage through the back door. 
The problem of material compensation was put on the political agenda by actors 
who had been involved in the repressive practices of the early 1980s. The necessity 
to deal with the legacy of the past was expressed by a social group composed of 
enforced perpetrators, and of ‘willing executioners’ (Goldhagen 1997). Thus, for 
this stage the inexistence of a clear dividing line between victims and perpetrators 
became very significant when addressing past abuses. In sum, however, some 
memories (such as the memories of many female war victims) were silenced or 
even erased – while other memories (such as the memories of the patrulleros) were 
strengthened.16  
 The debate on material reparation was initiated when the path of national poli-
tics was still shrouded in mystery. When president Portillo took office in 2000, 
political attitudes of key actors seemed to be inscrutable. Prominent figures joined 
the new Janus-faced cabinet: Otilia Lux de Cotí, a member of the Truth Commis-
sion, was made Minister of Culture, and Edgar Gutiérrez, a key member of 
REMHI, was appointed head of the ‘Secretary of Strategic Analysis’ – a civil in-
formation agency involved in the process of reforming the intelligence apparatus. 
 Human rights organizations such as GAM and CONAVIGUA had been lobby-
ing for a National Reparations Programme without any results, but the Politics of 
Restitution were put on the political agenda in summer 2002 when members of the 
PACs reorganized in order to demand compensation payment for unpaid duty. The 
government reacted immediately by sending a delegation of high-ranking govern-
ment officials and offering compensation payments. In October 2002, the Con-
gress, controlled by Rios Montt’s party Frente Republicano Guatemalteco (FRG), 
passed a law to borrow US$ 700 million from international financial markets in the 
form of Euro bonds. This loan, which was legitimized by the need to compensate 
former members of the PACs and victims, was designed to be spent on various 
purposes such as reducing the Ministry of Communication’s pile of debts, broaden-
ing the reserves of The National Bank, reducing the military, and, last but not least, 
‘other programmes’. In the run-up to the election campaign, the government began 
paying small compensation rates to former members of the PACs. Human rights 
organizations harshly criticized the payments. Many did not receive compensation 
payments; as an estimated one million men had forcibly participated in the PACs 
(CEH, Vol. II, 190, §1291), it was impossible to compensate all of them at once.  
 The most important aspect of this process was the fact that the government had 
legitimized the re-emergence of local structures of repression, not only by paying 
compensation payments, but also by negotiating with the re-organized members of 
the PACs (Oettler 2005). The abolition of the PACs was a key element of the peace 
accords and was formally realized in 1996,17 but soon after its formal abolition, 
MINUGUA registered the reappearance of these structures of repression. 
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MINUGUA documented numerous cases of human rights violations such as rape, 
murder and lynching committed by members of the PACs. Moreover, a tangled 
network of criminal and repressive structures became stronger during Portillo’s 
term of office (Sieder, Thomas, Vickers, Spence 2002). Another alarming sign was 
the ties between the reorganized PACs and the Association of Retired Military Of-
ficers (AVEMILGUA). In early 2002, Amnesty International criticized the exis-
tence of a so-called ‘corporate mafia state’ in Guatemala that was undermining any 
attempt to establish public security (Amnesty International 2002). In July 2003, 
after the courts had denied Efraín Ríos Montt from running for presidency, thou-
sands of PAC members and rioters were brought to the capital in order to violently 
protest against the ruling. The disruptive and tumultuous events of this ‘Black 
Thursday’ were never officially investigated or people prosecuted. This open dem-
onstration of reactionary power in Guatemala City was an exception, but in many 
remote parts of the country the structures of fear have never been weakened. 
The impact of truth finding 
The importance of the official truth finding process has to be seen in relation to its 
long-term influence on cultural memory and on national politics. At first glance, 
the CEH had only a marginal impact. But looking at it more closely, the extent to 
which the past could be addressed was quite impressive – given that powerful 
groups effectively stopped any attempt to end impunity and to change civil-
military relations. 
Narrativization of the past 
The presentation of the findings in February 1999 was the most important and 
dramatic public event since the signing of the final Peace Accord. The commis-
sioners had decided to give a public lesson in history instead of delivering long 
diplomatic speeches. 
 The CEH estimated that over 200,000 persons had been killed or had disap-
peared during the internal conflict and attributed 93 per cent of these killings to the 
State and 3 per cent to the guerrilla army (the remaining 4 per cent of the cases 
could not be attributed to either side). Ninety-one per cent of the crimes docu-
mented by the CEH were committed between 1978 and 1984. In 18 per cent of all 
cases, members of the PACs had been involved. As the counter-insurgency reached 
unprecedented levels in the early 1980s, the CEH analysed in detail the armed con-
frontation in four geographical regions: 1) Maya-Q’anjob’al and Maya-Chuj; in 
Barillas, Nentón and San Mateo Ixtatán in North Huehuetenango, 2) Maya-Ixil; in 
Nebaj, Cotzal and Chajul, Quiché, 3) Maya-K’iche’; in Joyabaj, Zacualpa and 
Chiché, Quiché, and 4) Maya-Achi; in Rabinal, Baja Verapaz. Based on the United 
Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
which had been ratified by Guatemala in 1949, the CEH came to the conclusion 
‘that agents of the State of Guatemala, within the framework of counterinsurgency 
operations carried out, between 1981 and 1983, acts of genocide against groups of 
Mayan people who lived in the four regions analysed’.18  
 The CEH by no means restricted itself to the purely quantitative documentation 
of human rights violations. The CEH broke powerful taboos when Christian To-
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muschat (2001) pointed out that an analysis of the armed confrontation must take 
into consideration its historical roots and the traditions of social exclusion, racism 
and authoritarian regimes. Moreover, the CEH described the extreme brutality of 
‘counterinsurgency’ operations and analysed the systematic violence of torture, 
rape and murder of women. In many cases, women were held prisoners and forced 
to submit to sexual violence over long periods of time. Many female Mayan vic-
tims reported that, as a consequence, they were banished from their families and 
communities by members of those communities who considered violated women 
shameful. 
 In general, the climate of terror was maintained by the fact that all acts of bru-
tality were carried out with impunity. 
Impunity permeated the country to such an extent that it took control of the 
very structure of the State, and became both a means and an end. As a means, it 
sheltered and protected the repressive acts of the State, as well as those acts 
committed by individuals who shared similar objectives; whilst as an end, it 
was a consequence of the methods used to repress and eliminate political and 
social opponents (CEH, Conclusions and Recommendations, Vol. V, §10). 
The historical narrative presented by the CEH went far beyond the history of the 
investigation of crimes committed by two warring parties, the military and the in-
surgent movement. The CEH pointed out that more than two actors had been in-
volved in the internal conflict: state institutions (judiciary, congress), universities, 
political parties, churches, locally and nationally powerful economic groups, and, 
last but not least, external actors. Guatemalan counter-insurgency practices had 
been supported by the United States. As anti-Communism and the National Secu-
rity Doctrine (DSN) dominated the political and military strategy of the United 
States in its strategic backyard, military assistance was provided to strengthen the 
Guatemalan intelligence apparatus and train the military in counter-insurgency 
techniques. To a lesser extent, the CEH also proved the involvement of other ex-
ternal actors, which included Cuba and Israel. 
 The CEH described different stages of the armed confrontation and their his-
toric roots: 
In the period from 1962 to 1970, operations were concentrated in the eastern 
part of the country, and in Guatemala City and the south coast, the victims be-
ing mainly peasants, members of rural union organizations, university and sec-
ondary school teachers and students and guerrilla sympathisers. In the years 
from 1971 to 1977, the repressive operations were more selective and geo-
graphically dispersed. Victims included community and union leaders, cate-
chists and students. During the most violent and bloody period of the entire 
armed confrontation, 1978-1985, military operations were concentrated in 
Quiché, Huehuetenango, Chimaltenango, Alta and Baja Verapaz, the south 
coast and the capital, the victims being principally Mayan and to a lesser extent 
Ladino. During the final period, 1986-1996, repressive action was selective, af-
fecting the Mayan and Ladino population to a similar extent, (Vol. V, §26-7). 
The CEH did not want to restrict itself to merely documenting the history of terror, 
oppression and suffering. It presented a historical narrative with a beginning (the 
colonial period), a main part (the armed confrontation), and an end (the post-war era).  
 During the 1980s and 1990s, two important political actors had emerged to lay 
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the foundations of Guatemalan civil society: the women’s movement and the Ma-
yan movement. When the ‘tragedy of the armed confrontation’19 came to an end in 
December 1996, the Mayan movement, which had been lobbying for an agreement 
on Indian rights, was visible in national politics more than ever before. This proc-
ess of the emergence and consolidation of the Mayan movement opened the final 
act of the drama written by the CEH: 
In the struggle against exclusions suffered since the foundation of the Guatema-
lan State, the Mayan people has made important contributions in the area of 
multiculturality and peace. These provide the essential bases for society as a 
whole to review its history and commit itself to building a new project of na-
tionhood consistent with its multiculturality, which should be inclusive, tolerant 
and proud of the wealth implicit in its cultural differences (Vol. V, §79). 
The CEH did not only place the crimes against humanity and events in a historical 
order: it had the hermeneutic right to interpret the facts, to reconstruct the story of 
Guatemalan violence.20 As Greg Grandin (2000, 397) stated, the ‘report, in contrast 
to previous truth commissions, dedicates most of its first volume to the “causes and 
origins of the internal armed conflict”. It is a damning narrative that indicts not just 
the nation’s ruling elite, but its culture and history as well’. The Truth Commis-
sion’s final report ‘Memory of Silence’ constitutes a narrative with a beginning, a 
climax and an end. It is ‘a narrative defined as a coherent account in which earlier 
events are cited to account for later ones. The narrative thus involves temporal 
causal sequencing […]. The narrative makes sense of action’ (Maier 2000, 271). 
 The narrative presented by the Guatemalan Truth Commission represented the 
hegemonic truth corresponding to the then current historiographic needs of the 
Guatemalan elite. The final report not only represented the opinions of many histo-
rians and politicians involved in Guatemalan politics (Grandin 2000, 405-7), it also 
reflected the global discourse on social existence at the end of the ‘age of ex-
tremes’ (Hobsbawm 1994). This global discourse focused on collective identity 
and the formation of ethnic boundaries as the main driving force behind crisis and 
conflict (Niethammer 2000). Accordingly, nation-building and ethnic inclusion 
were postulated as key elements of conflict prevention policy.  
 A decade after the fall of the Berlin wall, the CEH wrote a report that not only 
preserved past events but also included a prospective component, too (Oettler 
2004, chapter 6). The Commission for Historical Clarification supported and le-
gitimized the project of a ‘new democratic and participatory nation that values its 
multiethnic and pluricultural nature’ (CEH 1999, Vol. 5, §57). While many com-
mentators and analysts have noted the CEH’s contribution to overcome prejudices 
and racist fears by facing the facts of repression, few have pointed out the discur-
sive implications of the historical analysis presented by the commission (for an 
exception, see Grandin 2005). In trying to explain the origins of the armed con-
frontation, the CEH emphasized social roots and economic inequality, but when 
referring to the post-conflict era, the commission focussed more on the need to 
consolidate a multicultural national project than on the need to overcome the ex-
treme economic disparities. Corresponding to the hegemonic social theory in the 
post-Cold War era, ‘Memory of Silence’ focussed mainly on the policy of ethnic 
inclusion. Measures designed to deal with social exclusion were recommended as 
well, but they did not constitute the centre of the peace-building policy presented 
by the CEH.  
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 Nevertheless, official acknowledgement of the role played by the indigenous 
members of society constituted the most important symbolic victory of the Mayan 
movement since its resurgence in the mid 1980s.21 No matter how the ‘Memory of 
Silence’ was received by the population, the national narrative written by the CEH 
was the first official document presenting national history as a common history of 
Ladinos and indígenas. In a society in which the official history had always been 
the history of a Ladino elite, cultural memory began to change substantially. It is 
important to note, however, that it was not communicative memory, but cultural 
memory that began to change. ‘Memory of Silence’ constitutes an important ‘re-
usable and available’ (Assmann 1988, 15) foundational historiographic text, which 
may influence the multicultural Guatemalan self-image.  
 Even though the national narrative presented by the CEH has significantly 
modified cultural memory, it has not necessarily been transmitted to everyday life. 
Was the history written by the Truth Commission handed down from national 
‘memory politics’ to communicate remembering?  
 The public discussion that took place after the presentation of the commission’s 
findings showed that vast sectors of society agreed with its conclusions. The urban 
middle classes, as principal agents of a democratic system, were especially 
shocked by the findings of the Truth Commission and by the fact that they lived in 
a country with a genocidal past. Concerning this community of memory, ‘Memory 
of Silence’ brought about a new consciousness of history. As Oglesby pointed out, 
the report has had a multifaceted resonance. For example, ‘Memory of Silence’ has 
been important for curriculum projects. The publication of the CEH and REMHI 
reports ‘had created space for teachers and schools to consider treating topics that a 
few years ago would have been taboo’ (Oglesby 2004, 14). And at ‘the same time, 
the actual use of the CEH report was minimal […] in part because the notions of 
“historical memory” in various follow-up projects were conflated to mean simply 
the grim profile of the violence’ (2004, 14). Within this context it is important to 
note that some powerful sectors of society (for example, military factions or groups 
of entrepreneurs) refused to accept the conclusions and went on legitimizing the 
terrorist counter-insurgency practices of the past. Significant sectors of Guatemalan 
society, especially in the remote parts of the country, did not take notice or were 
not aware of a national event such as the publication of a ‘truth report’. Neverthe-
less, Guatemalan history was brought up for discussion in academic circles (in the 
Guatemalan capital and abroad) and among active members of human rights  
organizations.  
Memory Work 
Like the caterpillar that metamorphoses into a butterfly, the REMHI project went 
well beyond support for the official Truth Commission and transformed itself into 
an institutionalized form of memory work. The different modes of ‘recovering his-
torical memory’ aimed at working on subjective and collective memory within the 
context of a community. In this context, the term ‘memory work’ refers to the psy-
choanalytical dimension of the process of treating past atrocities. Freud used the 
term ‘memory work’, but he left his readers without a definition (Freud 1946, 133). 
I use the term to indicate a variety of meanings. First, the term implies a painful 
mental process involving high personal costs (and high personal benefits). The 
term ‘work’ was a central category where Freud attempted to describe the function-
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ing of the psychological apparatus;22 ‘memory work’ is associated with ‘work of 
mourning’ and ‘psychical working out’. When an average person is doing the 
‘work of mourning’, he or she is involved in the difficult, painful and repetitious 
process of memorializing a beloved object (person). In cases of ‘normal’ mourn-
ing, the process can be unbearable and thus threatened by suppression, negation or 
dissociation. When traumatic experiences and continuing fear is part of the 
mourner’s background, this work is far more painful. ‘Work of mourning presup-
poses a special kind of memory work. It is not so much a question of remembering 
facts and contents, but of the memory of behaviour, value presentations, emotions 
and fantasies’ (Mitscherlich 1987, 14; translation by A.O.). 
 Where CEH – and Convergencia por la Verdad – were primarily interested in 
ascertaining facts, REMHI tried to create protected spaces of communication and 
tear down the walls of silence that had encapsulated most of the victims. It was a 
semi-professional attempt to work through traumatic experiences and to construct 
social structures as a way of strengthening every attempt to overcome the psychical 
aftermath of war. This hints at a second dimension of the term memory work, 
which is connected with the feminist ‘Project Memory Work’ introduced by Frigga 
Haugg in the 1960s. Within the context of the women’s movement, this project 
was established in order to work out personal experiences within a group structure 
and to make visible the suppressed dimensions of experience. The collective pro-
cedure of memory work was aimed at reinforcing the subject’s capacity to act, us-
ing her/his memory for liberation. Where Haugg intended to liberate women from 
the chains of socialization, REMHI wanted to liberate war victims and reconstruct 
the social ties of indigenous communities within the framework of liberation theol-
ogy. The methods used by REMHI demonstrate the potential of truth commissions 
in helping victims to overcome their traumatic experiences. The main obstacles 
were the threatening re-emergence of local structures of repression, limited finan-
cial and personnel resources, and the refusal of many priests and bishops to support 
REMHI. In the end, ‘Guatemala – nunca más!’ became a new religious narrative 
legitimizing the memory work of Catholic groups and promoting the function of 
the Catholic Church as an institution of national reconciliation. 
Conclusion 
The Latin American ‘cycle of truth-telling exercises’ (Shifter and Jawahar 2004, 
127) began with the Argentine Commission on the Disappeared in 1983. Twenty 
years later, the Truth Commission is widely perceived as an instrument capable of 
reconciling societies and healing national wounds. In assessing the Guatemalan 
process of dealing with the past, one must say that the record is mixed. 
 What lessons can be drawn from the Guatemalan experience? First, it is impor-
tant to note that truth finding affects different registers of collective memory and 
different communities of memory. It is important to note as well that it was mainly 
civil society, and not state institutions, that provided a context for those with trau-
matic experiences to work through. As Sieder pointed out, ‘in the ethnically and 
politically fragmented society of Guatemala, grass-roots memory politics has be-
come a central part for the search for new collective identities in the post-war dis-
pensation’ (Sieder 2001a, 186). REMHI as a grass-roots project of memory work 
was better able to reach victims in the highland areas of Guatemala than those in-
volved with official memory politics. Even if this project was severely limited, it 
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demonstrated the need and the possibility of providing an alternative method of 
working through traumatic experiences with a fairly long-term perspective. 
REMHI was a tool to stimulate the public exchange of experiences and to liberate 
communicative memory. In addition, since this process of memorializing is em-
bedded in the rituals of the Catholic Church, it was influenced by religious narra-
tives of guilt and reconciliation.  
 Second, as political developments in Guatemala indicate, the positive impact of 
truth finding should not be overestimated. Ignatieff (1996) stated that truth com-
missions ‘reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public 
discourse’. But the Guatemalan experience shows that they do not necessarily and 
sustainably reduce the number of lies that can be circulated unchallenged in public 
discourse. The historical narrative written by a truth commission constitutes an 
important foundational text inserted in the mosaic of cultural memory. Thus, truth 
commissions produce a counterweight to other narratives circulating in public dis-
course. Nevertheless, as the frequent revision of courts’ decisions and the debate 
on material reparation politics show, the historical record has not yet been ‘set 
straight’ (Tepperman 2002, 129). Many communities of memory are still more 
affected by counter-narratives like the ‘lies/truths’ expressed by locally powerful 
patrulleros. 
 The evidence presented here shows that the social actors involved in the proc-
ess of commemorating the past are part of a complex interplay of non-egalitarian 
and instable power relations. Thus, in assessing the impact of truth commissions, 
we should realize that the terrain on which communicative and cultural memory is 
built is constantly shifting.  
* * * 
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Notes 
1. Being a common tool of democratic transition, truth commissions must investigate the dimensions, 
areas and patterns of atrocities committed during past dictatorships or internal wars, and elaborate 
recommendations relating to the politics of the past (Hayner 2001, Biggar 2001, Boraine 1995, 
Kritz 1995, Teitel 2000). They are often perceived as a panacea to heal and reconcile a wounded 
nation and to promote national unity (for a critical view see Ignatieff 1996). Within this context, 
they do not only serve to investigate crimes but also to write national history as well (Maier 2000). 
2. Fuchs and Nolte (2004) have applied the instruments of policy analysis (policy cycles, actor-
centred institutionalism) to Latin American Politics of the Past. 
3. An exception is Richard Wilson (2001), who analysed the historiographic significance of the South 
African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. 
4. CEH – the Commission for Historical Clarification.  
5. In Argentina, where the first important Latin American Truth Commission was established, the 
Madres de Plaza de Mayo demanded the creation of a parliamentary commission of inquiry as well. 
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When Alfonsín created the Comisión Nacional para la Desaparición de Personas (CONADEP) in 
1983, the Madres rejected it as being a commission ‘not even chosen by the people but by Alfonsín, 
who used it to give himself time’ (Bonafini 1988). Working closely together with other human 
rights organizations, the commission focused on identifying illegal detention camps and on analys-
ing the practice of disappearance and torture. 
6  GAM – Mutual Support Group. 
7. For more details on the Guatemalan peace process, the role of civil society and the debate on poli-
tics of the past, see Jonas (2000) and Wilson (1997). 
8  CONADEGUA – National Coordination for Human Rights in Guatemala. 
9  ACPD – Consultative Assembly of Internally Displaced Population. 
10. REMHI – Interdiocesan Project to Recover Historical Memory. 
11. After the assassination, many offices of REMHI closed down. Paradoxically, the assassination 
strengthened the project in the long run because a martyr had been created. 
12. German Historian Norbert Frei introduced the term ‘politics of the past’ (Vergangenheitspolitik) to 
name the German process of treating the past during the 1950s. After Germany’s sovereignty was 
restored, the Allies’ politics of denazification were superseded by the politics of the past, which 
consisted of three elements of a political process: granting amnesty, integrating the former adher-
ents of the Third Reich and establishing a normative distance to National Socialism (Frei 1999, 
397). When the translation of the book was published in 2002, the problem of translating the term 
Vergangenheitspolitik was bypassed. The English title is Adenauer’s Germany and the Nazi Past: 
The Politics of Amnesty and Integration.  
13. Acuerdo Global sobre Derechos Humanos (1994), chapter VIII; Acuerdo sobre el cronograma 
para la implementación, cumplimiento y verificación de los acuerdos de paz (1996), chapter 
III/A/§70. See also Oettler 2004, 102. 
14. A key actor in this process of revealing US-involvement in countries such as Cuba, Chile, South 
Africa, Iraq and Guatemala is the National Security Archive that is providing declassified US-
intelligence documents to a broader public (see http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv). 
15. Despite the fact that the court of appeals annulled the original sentence and ordered new trials in 
2003, the sentence was maintained due to a ruling of the Supreme Court.  
16. AVANCSO (2002), Remijnse (2002) and Sieder (2001b) analysed the complex structure of narra-
tives and counter-narratives at the local level. 
17. A witness of the Truth Commission declared, ‘They demobilized us on 13 September 1996 because 
of the peace accords and took away our weapons. Some patrollers started to cry because they did 
not want to give away their weapons’ (CEH, volume II, p. 234, §1402) 
18. Commission for Historical Clarification: Guatemala. Memory of Silence. Conclusions and Recom-
mendations, §122. Online report, see http://shr.aaas.org/guatemala/ceh/report/english/toc.html (ac-
cessed 4 August 03). 
19. Subtitle of chapter 4 (conclusions). CEH, volume V, pp. 21-40. 
20. The mandate of the CEH specifically stated that it shall ‘prepare a report that will provide objective 
elements of judgement, adressing all factors, internal as well as external’ (Acuerdo sobre el Esta-
blecimiento de la Comisión para el Esclarecimiento Histórico de las Violaciones a los Derechos 
Humanos y los Hechos de Violencia que han causado Sufrimiento a la Población Guatemalteca, 
Finalidades/II).  
21. The women’s movement scored a great symbolic success as well when the commissioners recorded 
the history of women’s suffering and fighting (CEH, chapter II/XIII, chapter III/II). Nevertheless, 
although the discourse referred to women’s history, this was not translated into politics to break the 
cycle of war-related violence against women. The comprehensive set of 84 recommendations pre-
sented by the CEH on 25 February 1999 did not include any programme designed to overcome 
gender inequality or to restore the dignity of female war victims. OASIS, an NGO lobbying for the 
rights of homosexuals, tried to induce the CEH to mention the history of repression against homo-
sexuals and transvestites in its report, but the commissioners decided not to refer to this tragedy of 
‘social cleansing’ – a subordinate truth of a social group invisible in Guatemalan politics. 
22. Work = Arbeit. Freudian terms include the following: Verarbeitung, Bearbeitung, Aufarbeitung, 
Durcharbeiten, Trauerarbeit, Traumarbeit. 
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